1 February 2018
30 August 2017
Paul Jackson reviews my book "Russia and the Western Far Right"
Paul Jackson, Senior Lecturer in History at the University of Northampton, reviews my book Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir for the anti-fascist magazine Searchlight. The review was published in Searchlight (Summer 2017), pp. 28-29.
13 August 2017
The “alt-right” has died in Charlottesville, as a term
I was never happy with the term “alt-right”. While I would occasionally use it, I always try to explain that the term is meaningless and dangerous, and should better be avoided in the media and academic writing.
The term “alternative right” – and “alt-right” is its shortened version – was coined in 2008 by an American conservative writer Paul Gottfried. In his article “The Decline and Rise of the Alternative Right”, Gottfried wrote about the crisis of paleoconservatism, an ideology that is characterised by its focus on traditional and religious values, limited government and opposition to multiculturalism and immigration.
In Gottfried’s view, paleoconservatism was, in the past, a good antidote to neo-conservatism that Gottfried rejected but that eventually came to dominate the Republican party. This implies that paleoconservatism was, for Gottfried, the Alternative Right, a Rightist alternative to the neo-conservative GOP. However, paleoconservatism withered away – and going back to the title of the article, that was “the decline of the alternative right” – but Gottfried welcomed the developments in the conservative movement outside the Republican party and, especially, young conservative non-Republicans to whom he referred as “post-paleos”. For him, “the rise of the alternative right” was exactly the emergence of “post-paleos” who were aiming at putting together “an independent intellectual Right, one that exists without movement establishment funding”.
The term “alternative right” – and “alt-right” is its shortened version – was coined in 2008 by an American conservative writer Paul Gottfried. In his article “The Decline and Rise of the Alternative Right”, Gottfried wrote about the crisis of paleoconservatism, an ideology that is characterised by its focus on traditional and religious values, limited government and opposition to multiculturalism and immigration.
In Gottfried’s view, paleoconservatism was, in the past, a good antidote to neo-conservatism that Gottfried rejected but that eventually came to dominate the Republican party. This implies that paleoconservatism was, for Gottfried, the Alternative Right, a Rightist alternative to the neo-conservative GOP. However, paleoconservatism withered away – and going back to the title of the article, that was “the decline of the alternative right” – but Gottfried welcomed the developments in the conservative movement outside the Republican party and, especially, young conservative non-Republicans to whom he referred as “post-paleos”. For him, “the rise of the alternative right” was exactly the emergence of “post-paleos” who were aiming at putting together “an independent intellectual Right, one that exists without movement establishment funding”.
6 July 2017
Ультраправый фронт активных мероприятий: Россия и европейские крайне правые
После падения режима Саддама Хуссейна в Ираке в здании одного из министерств были найдены документы, свидетельствовавшие об обширных контактах иракских властей с представителями западных деловых и политических кругов. Начиная с 1990-х гг. у режима Хуссейна были две основные проблемы на внешнеполитическом фронте: санкции со стороны западных стран и связанные с ними ограничения по продаже нефти, которые оказывали крайне негативное влияние на экономику Ирака, но удерживали страну от агрессивных действий в отношении соседей. Поэтому содержание международных контактов иракских властей было в основном связано с лоббированием снятия западных санкций и обхождением ограничений на продажу нефти – последнее осуществлялось с помощью нефтяных ваучеров, которыми режим Хуссейна расплачивался со своими иностранными союзниками.
Среди найденных документов был обнаружен договор, заключенный в 2002 году в Багдаде между иракскими властями с одной стороны и двумя австрийскими политиками – с другой. Этими австрийскими политиками были ныне покойный лидер праворадикальной «Австрийской партии свободы» (АПС) Йорг Хайдер и его помощник Эвальд Штадлер. Договор предполагал, что Хайдер и Штадлер становятся лоббистами иракского режима в Австрии и Европе, за что Хайдер получает 1.250.000 долларов США, а Штадлер – 3.750.000. К моменту заключения договора Штадлер уже возглавлял «Австрийско-иракское общество» и наряду с Хайдером активно критиковал западные санкции против режима Хуссейна.
Среди найденных документов был обнаружен договор, заключенный в 2002 году в Багдаде между иракскими властями с одной стороны и двумя австрийскими политиками – с другой. Этими австрийскими политиками были ныне покойный лидер праворадикальной «Австрийской партии свободы» (АПС) Йорг Хайдер и его помощник Эвальд Штадлер. Договор предполагал, что Хайдер и Штадлер становятся лоббистами иракского режима в Австрии и Европе, за что Хайдер получает 1.250.000 долларов США, а Штадлер – 3.750.000. К моменту заключения договора Штадлер уже возглавлял «Австрийско-иракское общество» и наряду с Хайдером активно критиковал западные санкции против режима Хуссейна.
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| Йорг Хайдер и Саддам Хуссейн в Багдаде |
9 June 2017
Andreas Umland reviews my forthcoming book "Russia and the Western Far Right"
Andreas Umland's review* of my forthcoming book, Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir, available for pre-order via Routledge and Amazon. (If you need a 20% discount for the pre-order via Routledge, give me your e-mail address in the comments section - it will not be published.)
5 June 2017
New books in the "Explorations of the Far Right" series
I am proud to announce the publication of two important books in the "Explorations of the Far Right" book series that I edit for ibidem Press: British Fascism: A Discourse-Historical Analysis by John E. Richardson and The Hungarian Far Right: Social Demand, Political Supply, and International Context by Péter Krekó and Attila Juhász.
John E. Richardson, British Fascism: A Discourse-Historical Analysis (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 2017)
Fascism is inherently duplicitous, claiming one thing whilst being committed to something else. In examining this dishonesty, it is essential to distinguish between the surface arguments in fascist discourse and the underlying ideological commitments. Analyzing contemporary fascism is particularly difficult, since no fascist party admits to being fascist. Drawing on the critical insights of historical and linguistic research, this book offers an original and discerning approach to the critical analysis of fascism. It demonstrates that any understanding of the continuing popularity of fascist political ideology requires interdisciplinary analysis which exposes the multiple layers of meanings within fascist texts and the ways they relate to social and historic context. It is only through contextualization we can demonstrate that when fascists echo concepts and arguments from mainstream political discourse (e.g. 'British jobs for British workers') they are not being used in the same way.
Péter Krekó, Attila Juhász, The Hungarian Far Right: Social Demand, Political Supply, and International Context (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 2017)
This timely book examines far-right politics in Hungary—but its relevance points much beyond Hungary. With its two main players, the radical right Jobbik and populist right Fidesz, it is at the same time an Eastern European, European, and global phenomenon. Jobbik and Fidesz, political parties with a populist, nativist, authoritarian approach, Eastern and pro-Russian orientation, and strong anti-Western stance, are on the one hand products of the problematic transformation period that is typical for post-communist countries. But they are products of a "populist zeitgeist" in the West as well, with declining trust in representative democratic and supranational institutions, politicians, experts, and the mainstream media. The rise of politicians such as Nigel Farage in the U.K., Marine Le Pen in France, Norbert Hofer in Austria, and, most notably, Donald Trump in the U.S. are clear indications of this trend. In this book, the story of Jobbik (and Fidesz), contemporary players of the Hungarian radical right scene, are not treated as separate case studies, but as representatives of broader international political trends. Far-right parties such as Jobbik (and increasingly Fidesz) are not pathologic and extraordinary, but exaggerated, seemingly pathological manifestations of normal, mainstream politics. The radical right is not the opposite and denial of the mainstream, but the sharp caricature of the changing national, and often international mainstream.
John E. Richardson, British Fascism: A Discourse-Historical Analysis (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 2017)
Fascism is inherently duplicitous, claiming one thing whilst being committed to something else. In examining this dishonesty, it is essential to distinguish between the surface arguments in fascist discourse and the underlying ideological commitments. Analyzing contemporary fascism is particularly difficult, since no fascist party admits to being fascist. Drawing on the critical insights of historical and linguistic research, this book offers an original and discerning approach to the critical analysis of fascism. It demonstrates that any understanding of the continuing popularity of fascist political ideology requires interdisciplinary analysis which exposes the multiple layers of meanings within fascist texts and the ways they relate to social and historic context. It is only through contextualization we can demonstrate that when fascists echo concepts and arguments from mainstream political discourse (e.g. 'British jobs for British workers') they are not being used in the same way.
Péter Krekó, Attila Juhász, The Hungarian Far Right: Social Demand, Political Supply, and International Context (Stuttgart: ibidem Press, 2017)
This timely book examines far-right politics in Hungary—but its relevance points much beyond Hungary. With its two main players, the radical right Jobbik and populist right Fidesz, it is at the same time an Eastern European, European, and global phenomenon. Jobbik and Fidesz, political parties with a populist, nativist, authoritarian approach, Eastern and pro-Russian orientation, and strong anti-Western stance, are on the one hand products of the problematic transformation period that is typical for post-communist countries. But they are products of a "populist zeitgeist" in the West as well, with declining trust in representative democratic and supranational institutions, politicians, experts, and the mainstream media. The rise of politicians such as Nigel Farage in the U.K., Marine Le Pen in France, Norbert Hofer in Austria, and, most notably, Donald Trump in the U.S. are clear indications of this trend. In this book, the story of Jobbik (and Fidesz), contemporary players of the Hungarian radical right scene, are not treated as separate case studies, but as representatives of broader international political trends. Far-right parties such as Jobbik (and increasingly Fidesz) are not pathologic and extraordinary, but exaggerated, seemingly pathological manifestations of normal, mainstream politics. The radical right is not the opposite and denial of the mainstream, but the sharp caricature of the changing national, and often international mainstream.
3 June 2017
Help needed: Moscow-based Sova Centre is declared a "foreign agent" and fined
Dear Friends and Colleagues,
The Moscow-based Sova Centre, which conducts top-notch research on nationalism and racism in Russia, needs our help.
The Centre has been forcibly declared a "foreign agent" in Russia and fined 300 thousand roubles (appr. € 4,717) for not willingly registering as a "foreign agent". They are now crowd-funding to pay the fine and continue their important work.
I have been cooperating with the Sova Centre since 2007, and I know them as consummate professionals and honorable people. I wrote and translated articles for them, and co-authored the Russian-language book "Radical Russian Nationalism" published by Sova in 2009. The overwhelming majority of their published books are available for free online. Their books are an absolute must for any serious researcher of the Russian far right.
If you are willing to help, you can find information on how you can do this here or here.
Details for donations:
Name of the payee: ROO Tsentr SOVA
Address -
Street: Armyanskiy pereulok 9
Postcode: 101000
City: Moscow
Country: Russian Federation
Account No.: 40703840700010865184
Bank: UniCredit Bank
SWIFT: IMBKRUMM
Purpose of payment: Targeted donation for paying the fine
Correspondent bank, or interbank, for payments in USD:
Account No.: 40703840700010865184
Bank: JPMorgan Chase Bank
SWIFT: CHASUS33
Correspondent bank, or interbank, for payments in EUR:
Account No.: 40703978300010865184
Bank: UniCredit Bank AG
SWIFT: HYVEDEMM
Details for donations:
Name of the payee: ROO Tsentr SOVA
Address -
Street: Armyanskiy pereulok 9
Postcode: 101000
City: Moscow
Country: Russian Federation
Account No.: 40703840700010865184
Bank: UniCredit Bank
SWIFT: IMBKRUMM
Purpose of payment: Targeted donation for paying the fine
Correspondent bank, or interbank, for payments in USD:
Account No.: 40703840700010865184
Bank: JPMorgan Chase Bank
SWIFT: CHASUS33
Correspondent bank, or interbank, for payments in EUR:
Account No.: 40703978300010865184
Bank: UniCredit Bank AG
SWIFT: HYVEDEMM
5 May 2017
A letter to a Friend on Tolkien, racism and the European New Right
Dear Friend,
As I told you before, I would love to share with you some thoughts on the cultural links between Tolkien and the European New Right (ENR). Perhaps, these thoughts are not new and eventually commonplace for you, but even if it is so, maybe you can clarify some points.
I agree with you completely that the notion of mythical time expressed in Tolkien’s works was and still is the major reason of the adoption of his ideas by the ENR. Of course, the nostalgia, as you write, for "a total world view [and] a holistic understanding of existence, warm and 'alive'" is crucial to the ENR. In Tolkien’s works one can also find references to the four Yugas, which are important to the ENR influenced by Integral Traditionalism of René Guénon and some others: "the Ainulindale", "the Years of the Lamps", "the Years of the Trees" and "the Years of the Sun". However, I believe that Tolkien’s racism is also important for the ENR.
As I told you before, I would love to share with you some thoughts on the cultural links between Tolkien and the European New Right (ENR). Perhaps, these thoughts are not new and eventually commonplace for you, but even if it is so, maybe you can clarify some points.
I agree with you completely that the notion of mythical time expressed in Tolkien’s works was and still is the major reason of the adoption of his ideas by the ENR. Of course, the nostalgia, as you write, for "a total world view [and] a holistic understanding of existence, warm and 'alive'" is crucial to the ENR. In Tolkien’s works one can also find references to the four Yugas, which are important to the ENR influenced by Integral Traditionalism of René Guénon and some others: "the Ainulindale", "the Years of the Lamps", "the Years of the Trees" and "the Years of the Sun". However, I believe that Tolkien’s racism is also important for the ENR.
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| J.R.R. Tolkien |
21 April 2017
Marine Le Pen Is No Patriot of France
In the beginning of the 1980s, Belgian post-war neo-fascist ideologue Jean Thiriart wrote that he wanted to see the formation of a Euro-Soviet Empire, a fascist-communist super-state that would stretch from Vladivostok to Dublin. He believed that Moscow could “make Europe European” as an antithesis to what believed was an Americanised Europe, and was ready for “total collaboration” with the Soviet Union.
He was no stranger to “total collaboration”, as he served in the Waffen SS in the 1940s and was convicted for his collaborationism with the Third Reich after the war, but in the 1980s he would swear allegiance to a different totalitarian regime: “I will then be the first to put a red star on my cap. Soviet Europe, yes, without reservations”.
Thiriart’s dreams never came true, but he has followers who would collaborate with the authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin who, they believe, would also “make Europe European”. These are extreme right activists and politicians who see in Putin’s Russia “a bastion of traditional values” and “a beacon of hope” in their fight against liberalism and united Europe.
He was no stranger to “total collaboration”, as he served in the Waffen SS in the 1940s and was convicted for his collaborationism with the Third Reich after the war, but in the 1980s he would swear allegiance to a different totalitarian regime: “I will then be the first to put a red star on my cap. Soviet Europe, yes, without reservations”.
Thiriart’s dreams never came true, but he has followers who would collaborate with the authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin who, they believe, would also “make Europe European”. These are extreme right activists and politicians who see in Putin’s Russia “a bastion of traditional values” and “a beacon of hope” in their fight against liberalism and united Europe.
20 April 2017
Marine Le Pen n’hésiterait pas à rendre la France dépendante de la Russie
Au début des années 1980, Jean Thiriart (1922-1992), un idéologue néofasciste belge d’après-guerre, appelait de ses vœux la création d’un empire eurosoviétique, un super-Etat fascisto-communiste qui s’étendrait de Vladivostok à Dublin. Il était convaincu que Moscou pouvait « faire l’Europe européenne » comme antithèse à ce qu’il jugeait être l’Europe américanisée, et prônait « la collaboration totale » avec l’Union soviétique.
La collaboration totale, il connaissait, puisqu’il s’était enrôlé dans la Waffen SS dans les années 1940, ce qui lui avait valu d’être condamné à la Libération. Dans les années 1980, il allait prêter allégeance à un autre régime totalitaire : « Je serai alors le premier à mettre une étoile rouge sur ma casquette. L’Europe soviétique, oui sans réticence ».
Les rêves de Thiriart ne se sont jamais concrétisés, mais l’homme a des disciples prêts à collaborer avec le régime autoritaire de Vladimir Poutine qui, selon eux, veut aussi « faire l’Europe européenne ». Ce sont des militants et politiciens d’extrême droite qui voient dans la Russie de Poutine « un bastion des valeurs traditionnelles » et une « lueur d’espoir » dans leur combat contre le libéralisme et l’Europe unie.
La collaboration totale, il connaissait, puisqu’il s’était enrôlé dans la Waffen SS dans les années 1940, ce qui lui avait valu d’être condamné à la Libération. Dans les années 1980, il allait prêter allégeance à un autre régime totalitaire : « Je serai alors le premier à mettre une étoile rouge sur ma casquette. L’Europe soviétique, oui sans réticence ».
Les rêves de Thiriart ne se sont jamais concrétisés, mais l’homme a des disciples prêts à collaborer avec le régime autoritaire de Vladimir Poutine qui, selon eux, veut aussi « faire l’Europe européenne ». Ce sont des militants et politiciens d’extrême droite qui voient dans la Russie de Poutine « un bastion des valeurs traditionnelles » et une « lueur d’espoir » dans leur combat contre le libéralisme et l’Europe unie.
4 April 2017
Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir (pre-order)
My forthcoming book Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir is now available for pre-order via Routledge or via several Amazon websites: France, Italy, Spain, UK, Canada, Japan, US, India.
Description:
The growing influence on the Western far right has been much discussed in the media recently. This book is the first detailed inquiry into what has been a neglected but critically important trend: the growing links between Russian actors and Western far right activists, publicists, ideologues, and politicians. The author uses a range of sources including interviews, video footage, leaked communications, official statements and press coverage in order to discuss both historical and contemporary Russia in terms of its relationship with the Western far right.
Initial contacts between Russian political actors and Western far right activists were established in the early 1990s, but these contacts were low profile. As Moscow has become more anti-Western, these contacts have become more intense and have operated at a higher level. The book shows that the Russian establishment was first interested in using the Western far right to legitimise Moscow’s politics and actions both domestically and internationally, but more recently Moscow has begun to support particular far right political forces to gain leverage on European politics and undermine the liberal-democratic consensus in the West.
Contributing to ongoing scholarly debates about Russia’s role in the world, its strategies aimed at securing legitimation of Putin’s regime both internationally and domestically, modern information warfare and propaganda, far right politics and activism in the West, this book draws on theories and methods from history, political science, area studies, and media studies and will be of interest to students, scholars, activists and practitioners in these areas.
6 March 2017
The Italian far right Lega Nord builds closer ties with Moscow
Late at night on 5 March, the leader of the Italian far right Lega Nord (Northern League, LN) Matteo Salvini flew to Moscow. The next day, on 6 March, Salvini and deputy chairman of the Russian "parliament" Sergey Zheleznyak signed a coordination agreement between the LN and the ruling Yedinaya Rossiya (United Russia, ER) party.
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| The Lega Nord's Matteo Salvini is flying to Moscow on 5 March 2017 |
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| Matteo Salvini and Sergey Zheleznyak sign the coordination agreement between the Lega Nord and the United Russia. Moscow, 6 March 2017 |
1 March 2017
AfD and FPÖ politicans observe the illegitimate referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh
On 20 February 2017, the de-facto authorities of the unrecognised state of Nagorno-Karabakh held a "constitutional referendum". It was observed by a number of fake electoral monitors including several European far right politicians.
Nagorno-Karabakh is the territory populated largely by ethnic Armenians and is disputed by Azerbaijan and Armenia, but is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. Moscow is formally not taking sides in this conflict and has not recognised the legitimacy of the "constitutional referendum". And yet the Kremlin is interested in maintaining the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and is eagerly selling heavy weaponry to both countries. Instability and enmity between Russia's neighbours helps Moscow keep them in its sphere of influence.
Thus, it was hardly a surprise to see in Nagorno-Karabakh "electoral monitors", in particular, from the far right Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) and Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ), which had already worked for various Russian structures promoting Moscow's foreign policy interests through biased "electoral observation". They were accompanied by Manuel Ochsenreiter, the editor of the far-right German magazine Zuerst! who had been engaged in pro-Moscow activities for several years already.
Nagorno-Karabakh is the territory populated largely by ethnic Armenians and is disputed by Azerbaijan and Armenia, but is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. Moscow is formally not taking sides in this conflict and has not recognised the legitimacy of the "constitutional referendum". And yet the Kremlin is interested in maintaining the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and is eagerly selling heavy weaponry to both countries. Instability and enmity between Russia's neighbours helps Moscow keep them in its sphere of influence.
Thus, it was hardly a surprise to see in Nagorno-Karabakh "electoral monitors", in particular, from the far right Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) and Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (Freedom Party of Austria, FPÖ), which had already worked for various Russian structures promoting Moscow's foreign policy interests through biased "electoral observation". They were accompanied by Manuel Ochsenreiter, the editor of the far-right German magazine Zuerst! who had been engaged in pro-Moscow activities for several years already.
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| (left to right) Enrico Komning (AfD), Thomas Rudy (AfD), Holger Arppe (AfD), Manuel Ochsenreiter (Zuerst!). Nagorno-Karabakh, February 2017 |
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| (left to right) Holger Arppe (AfD), Wolfgang Jung (FPÖ). Nagorno-Karabakh, February 2017 |
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| (left to right) Enrico Komning (AfD), Gerhard Dörfler (FPÖ). Nagorno-Karabakh, February 2017 |
26 January 2017
Public lecture: Russia and the Western Far Right
My public lecture on the relations between various Russian actors and the Western far right at the Institute for Human Sciences (Vienna, Austria).
The lecture discusses relations between various Russian actors (activists, politicians, organisations, media, officials, etc.) and the Western far right. It provides a historical perspective, discussing the pro-Soviet or pro-Russian views of particular Western far right activists, but its major focus is contemporary Russia. As Moscow has become more anti-Western, contacts with the Western far right have become more intense and have operated at a high level. The lecture shows that the Russian establishment was first interested in using the Western far right to legitimise Moscow’s politics and actions both domestically and internationally, but more recently Moscow has begun to support particular far right political forces to gain leverage on European politics and undermine the liberal-democratic consensus in the West.
The lecture discusses relations between various Russian actors (activists, politicians, organisations, media, officials, etc.) and the Western far right. It provides a historical perspective, discussing the pro-Soviet or pro-Russian views of particular Western far right activists, but its major focus is contemporary Russia. As Moscow has become more anti-Western, contacts with the Western far right have become more intense and have operated at a high level. The lecture shows that the Russian establishment was first interested in using the Western far right to legitimise Moscow’s politics and actions both domestically and internationally, but more recently Moscow has begun to support particular far right political forces to gain leverage on European politics and undermine the liberal-democratic consensus in the West.
29 November 2016
What lessons can European leaders learn from Trump’s victory?
As the news about the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential elections have shocked many in Europe, it is high time for European leaders to learn lessons from the outcome of these elections and – to quote Winston Churchill – not let a good crisis go to waste.
The US presidential electoral campaign was characterised by the “Europeanisation” of the American politics – something that never happened before. Discarding some obvious differences between the American and European political domains, Bernie Sanders appeared a typical European social democrat, Hillary Clinton – a European pro-establishment centrist, and Donald Trump – a European anti-establishment radical right-wing populist. Trump’s rhetoric during the campaign was notorious for anti-immigrant and racist statements, so it was only natural that European right-wing politicians such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the former leader of Britain’s UKIP Nigel Farage or the president of Front National Marine Le Pen overwhelmingly supported Trump during his campaign.
The US presidential electoral campaign was characterised by the “Europeanisation” of the American politics – something that never happened before. Discarding some obvious differences between the American and European political domains, Bernie Sanders appeared a typical European social democrat, Hillary Clinton – a European pro-establishment centrist, and Donald Trump – a European anti-establishment radical right-wing populist. Trump’s rhetoric during the campaign was notorious for anti-immigrant and racist statements, so it was only natural that European right-wing politicians such as Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the former leader of Britain’s UKIP Nigel Farage or the president of Front National Marine Le Pen overwhelmingly supported Trump during his campaign.
29 October 2016
Italian Delegation to Russia-annexed Crimea in October 2016: Between Politics and Business
On 14-16 October 2016, an Italian delegation consisting of 18 politicians and businessmen visited Crimea illegally annexed by Russian from Ukraine in March 2016. The political part of the delegation was largely represented by regional politicians from far right parties such as the Northern League (Lega Nord) and Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), but the delegation also featured one politician from the left-wing populist party Free Alternative (Alternativa Libera). The business part was represented by the leaders of the Italian companies Albrigi, Brescia Hydropower, Cantina di Soave, Scandiuzzi Steel Constructions, and Veronesi.
This trip was, to a certain extent, a follow-up of the Second Yalta International Economic Forum that took place in Crimea in April 2016. The forum was co-hosted by the EU-sanctioned “Prime Minister of the Republic of Crimea” Sergey Aksyonov and Andrey Nazarov, co-chair of the All-Russian Civic Organisation “Business Russia” (Delovaya Rossiya) which is a union of businessmen working in non-energy sectors of Russian economy. It was the “Business Russia” organisation that officially invited and paid for the trip of the Italian delegation, and Nazarov was their main host in Crimea in October.
This trip was, to a certain extent, a follow-up of the Second Yalta International Economic Forum that took place in Crimea in April 2016. The forum was co-hosted by the EU-sanctioned “Prime Minister of the Republic of Crimea” Sergey Aksyonov and Andrey Nazarov, co-chair of the All-Russian Civic Organisation “Business Russia” (Delovaya Rossiya) which is a union of businessmen working in non-energy sectors of Russian economy. It was the “Business Russia” organisation that officially invited and paid for the trip of the Italian delegation, and Nazarov was their main host in Crimea in October.
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| Italian collaborators travelling to Russia-annexed Crimea |
17 October 2016
Die nicht mehr länger stille Gegenrevolution
1977 veröffentlichte Ronald Inglehart sein weithin gefeiertes Buch „Die stille Revolution“, in dem er darlegte, dass sich im Westen eine „stille Revolution“ ereigne, die diesen von Grund auf verändere.[1] Der beispiellose Wohlstand, den die westlichen Nationen während des Kalten Kriegs und angesichts des Ausbleibens eines totalen Kriegs erfahren durften, trug laut Inglehart zu einem schrittweisen Transformationsprozess von materialistischen individuellen Werten zu postmaterialistischen bei. Sobald die Bedürfnisse des physischen Überlebens gestillt sind, beginnen Menschen ihre Bedürfnisse nach Liebe, Zugehörigkeit und Wertschätzung zu stillen. Damit rückt die Bedeutung „intellektueller und ästhetischer Zufriedenheit“ bzw. sog. postmaterialistischer Werte ins Zentrum. In der politischen Sphäre wurde die „stille Revolution“ laut Inglehart von zwei bedeutenden Trends unterstützt: 1) „Eine Verlagerung von einem überwiegenden Schwerpunkt auf Materialverbrauch und Sicherheit hin zu einer größeren Sorge um die Lebensqualität“; und 2) „eine Zunahme an politischen Fähigkeiten in den westlichen Öffentlichkeiten, die es ihnen erlaubte, eine aktivere Rolle beim Fällen wichtiger politischer Entscheidungen zu spielen.“[2] Natürlich waren die Postmaterialisten nur eine Minderheit in den westlichen Gesellschaften, aber wohl die am besten ausgebildete und aktivste in der Politik. Postmaterialisten waren auch die zentrale treibende Kraft bei der europäischen Integration und bei der Förderung einer kosmopolitischen Identität.
19 August 2016
Welcome to illiberal democracy
Co-authored by Anton Shekhovtsov and Peter Pomerantsev
One after another the narratives that prop up belief in western liberal democracy have fallen. Ideal financial system? Not after the 2008 crisis and the euro. Military superiority? Iraq and Afghanistan have put an end to that. Effective politics? See gridlock in Washington DC and arm-twisting in Brussels.
Now the final, perhaps most fundamental, narrative risks unravelling. The supremacy of liberal democracy is rooted in the triumph of 1989: the liberation of Central Europe from the Kremlin’s authoritarianism; Václav Havel emerging from prison to become President in Prague Castle; the successful transition to democracy via European Union membership and the security blanket of NATO. The latter process was particularly important for the post-socialist states. Already in the 1990s, the prospect of the EU membership served as an impetus for reform of inefficient economies and dysfunctional political systems. At the same time, NATO provided security guarantees to the new democratising societies in Central and Eastern Europe that witnessed Russian destabilising activities in Moldova and Georgia in 1992—activities that resulted in the infringement of territorial integrity and dramatically hampered democratisation in these post-Soviet states.
One after another the narratives that prop up belief in western liberal democracy have fallen. Ideal financial system? Not after the 2008 crisis and the euro. Military superiority? Iraq and Afghanistan have put an end to that. Effective politics? See gridlock in Washington DC and arm-twisting in Brussels.
Now the final, perhaps most fundamental, narrative risks unravelling. The supremacy of liberal democracy is rooted in the triumph of 1989: the liberation of Central Europe from the Kremlin’s authoritarianism; Václav Havel emerging from prison to become President in Prague Castle; the successful transition to democracy via European Union membership and the security blanket of NATO. The latter process was particularly important for the post-socialist states. Already in the 1990s, the prospect of the EU membership served as an impetus for reform of inefficient economies and dysfunctional political systems. At the same time, NATO provided security guarantees to the new democratising societies in Central and Eastern Europe that witnessed Russian destabilising activities in Moldova and Georgia in 1992—activities that resulted in the infringement of territorial integrity and dramatically hampered democratisation in these post-Soviet states.
17 August 2016
The alleged terrorist plot in Crimea may be a Russian psyop
Early in the morning on the 7th of August, Russian border guards closed all the security checkpoints on the border between Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in March 2014, and the rest of Ukraine. Witnesses reported the sounds of shots fired near the administrative border. The Russians re-opened the security checkpoints later but offered no official explanation as to the reasons of their closure in the first place. Some Russian media and bloggers claimed that there had been a fire-fight between Ukrainian “intruders” and Russian personnel; the alleged fire-fight had ended with one Russian killed and three wounded.
Since the closure of the border on the 7th of August, witnesses reported an increased military presence in Crimean towns and villages, while checkpoints were set up along major Crimean roads. It looked like the Russian servicemen were looking for someone.
Since the closure of the border on the 7th of August, witnesses reported an increased military presence in Crimean towns and villages, while checkpoints were set up along major Crimean roads. It looked like the Russian servicemen were looking for someone.
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| FSB as part of Russia's occupation army in Crimea |
15 August 2016
The Far Right Front of Russian Active Measures in Europe
The relations between Russia and the European far right is not a new phenomenon, but they acquired particular salience in the recent few years, especially after the Russian annexation of Crimea and the start of the Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine.
Tactical collaboration with the European, especially German, extreme right characterised even the Cold War period of Russian history despite the horrors of the Second World War and the Soviet Union’s official condemnation of fascism. One example of Soviet collaboration with the German extreme right is the Soviet financial support for the extreme right neutralist movement in West Germany in the beginning of the 1950s. That period was marked by the beginning of the Cold War, and, in its struggle against the West, the Soviets employed a broad range of what they called “active measures” – actions comprising of establishing espionage rings in Western societies, spreading disinformation among Western publics, buying political influence, supporting socialist and communist parties, infiltrating Western peace movements, etc. The beginning of the 1950s was also a period in which West German political elites discussed a prospect of their country joining NATO. The Soviets opposed such a development and supported not only left-wing organisations in West Germany, but also extreme right neutralist movements that also opposed NATO membership.
Tactical collaboration with the European, especially German, extreme right characterised even the Cold War period of Russian history despite the horrors of the Second World War and the Soviet Union’s official condemnation of fascism. One example of Soviet collaboration with the German extreme right is the Soviet financial support for the extreme right neutralist movement in West Germany in the beginning of the 1950s. That period was marked by the beginning of the Cold War, and, in its struggle against the West, the Soviets employed a broad range of what they called “active measures” – actions comprising of establishing espionage rings in Western societies, spreading disinformation among Western publics, buying political influence, supporting socialist and communist parties, infiltrating Western peace movements, etc. The beginning of the 1950s was also a period in which West German political elites discussed a prospect of their country joining NATO. The Soviets opposed such a development and supported not only left-wing organisations in West Germany, but also extreme right neutralist movements that also opposed NATO membership.
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